Potential International Implications of a New Electoral Super-Cycle in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Javier Surasky




Latin America and the Caribbean are entering a pivotal electoral super-cycle in 2025 and 2026, with 17 countries—over half the region's independent nations—holding national elections. These contests, spanning presidential, legislative, and parliamentary elections, will reshape the political landscape from Mexico to Chile and across the Caribbean. A defining feature is the intense scrutiny faced by incumbent presidents who win runoffs after losing in the first round of voting, placing their polarizing agendas under public and legislative review. Amid declining trust in democratic institutions, the outcomes will influence regional governance, global trade, migration, the United Nations Secretary-General election, and geopolitical alignments.

The super-cycle begins in 2025 with 13 countries holding elections, followed by nine in 2026 (with Barbados as a potential case). Key contests include:

  • Ecuador (February 2025): President Daniel Noboa, who lost the 2023 first round (23.47% vs. Luisa González's 33.61%) but won the runoff (51.83% vs. 48.17%), seeks re-election amid security crises. In 2025, after a virtual tie between the same candidates in the first round (Noboa: 44.17%; González: 44%), the current President was re-elected in a ballotage, defeating González by 55.6% to 44.3% of the voting.
  • Bolivia (August 2025): President Luis Arce, elected with 55.1% in the 2020 first round, navigates tensions with Evo Morales' candidacy.
  • Chile (November 2025): President Gabriel Boric, who lost the 2021 first round (25.83% vs. José Antonio Kast's 27.91%) but won the runoff (55.87% vs. 44.13%), is ineligible to run, leaving his progressive agenda under scrutiny.
  • Brazil (October 2026): President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who led the 2022 first round (48.43% vs. Jair Bolsonaro's 43.20%) and won the runoff (50.90% vs. 49.10%), cannot run again.
  • Colombia (May 2026): President Gustavo Petro, who led the 2022 first round (40.32% vs. Rodolfo Hernández's 28.15%) and won the runoff (50.42% vs. 47.35%), is ineligible to run.
  • Costa Rica (February 2026): President Rodrigo Chaves, who lost the 2022 first round (16.70% vs. José María Figueres' 27.28%) but won the runoff (52.84% vs. 47.16%), cannot run consecutively.
In Argentina (October 2025), midterm elections will test President Javier Milei's leadership. Milei lost the 2023 first round (29.98% vs. Sergio Massa's 36.78%) but won the runoff (55.69% vs. 44.31%).

    Caribbean nations, including Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Guyana (in 2025), as well as the Bahamas and St. Lucia (in 2026), will hold parliamentary elections, with leaders chosen by their respective legislatures. Haiti's planned 2026 elections, the first in a decade, face uncertainty due to gang violence.

    Some incumbent presidents, namely Daniel Noboa (Ecuador), Javier Milei (Argentina), Gabriel Boric (Chile), and Rodrigo Chaves (Costa Rica), lost their first-round elections, relying on runoff victories to secure their offices. These narrow wins reflect polarized electorates and fragile mandates, amplifying scrutiny of their policies.

    In Argentina, Milei's austerity measures, including subsidy cuts, have helped stabilize inflation but have sparked protests. The 2025 midterms will determine if his La Libertad Avanza party retains legislative support. In Ecuador, Noboa's security crackdowns, targeting gangs, are central to his 2025 re-election bid, but escalating violence threatens his base. Boric's constitutional and pension reforms in Chile have faltered, and the 2025 presidential race will reflect voter judgment on his progressive vision. While popular, Chaves's anti-corruption stance in Costa Rica faces economic challenges, influencing the 2026 race. These leaders' reliance on runoffs underscores a regional trend of divided electorates, where governing without a first-round majority can erode legitimacy amid economic or social unrest.

    This new super-cycle will happen while public trust in democracy across Latin America and the Caribbean erodes significantly, creating a challenging backdrop. According to Latinobarómetro (2023), overall support for democracy as the preferred form of government fell to 48%, down from 60% a decade earlier, with only one in five citizens expressing trust in governments. Satisfaction with democracy's performance is even lower, having plummeted from 44% in 2009 to 24% in 2018, with 71% of citizens expressing dissatisfaction. This discontent is driven by economic inequality, corruption, and insecurity, with 80% of respondents in 2018 viewing income distribution as unfair and 43% fearing crime victimization.

    Worryingly, openness to non-democratic regimes is rising. Latinobarómetro reports that indifference between democratic and authoritarian systems climbed from 16% in 2009 to 28% in 2018, with 54% of Latin Americans in 2024 willing to accept an undemocratic regime if it solves problems, up from 44% in 2002. This trend is pronounced in countries like El Salvador (54%) and Honduras (41%), where strongman leaders like Nayib Bukele enjoy high approval (78% in El Salvador) despite undermining democratic norms. Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Chile show the highest support for democracy, while Honduras, Suriname, and Guatemala rank lowest. Trust decline is most severe in Argentina, Colombia, Jamaica, and Suriname, probably due to economic reasons fueling disillusionment.

    Younger generations offer a glimmer of hope, with Vanderbilt's LAPOP Lab noting that they are more committed to democratic ideals than previous generations, despite being more critical of current systems (The 2023 Americas Barometer: Taking the Pulse of Democracy in the Americas, p. 60-61). However, pervasive food insecurity (one in three households) and distrust in elections, legislatures (21% trust), and political parties (13% trust) create fertile ground for populist or authoritarian appeals, threatening the super-cycle's democratic integrity.

    From an international perspective, the super-cycle's outcomes will have potential global and regional consequences:

    • Economic and Trade Impacts: Latin America supplies critical commodities like lithium (Chile, Bolivia), soy (Brazil, Argentina), and oil (Brazil, Colombia). Policy shifts could disrupt global markets. A conservative win in Chile or a populist surge in Bolivia may alter mining laws, impacting electric vehicle battery supply chains. Brazil's 2026 election will shape the future of agribusiness and Amazon conservation, both of which are crucial to global food security and climate change mitigation goals.
    • Migration and Stability: Political or economic instability could amplify migration. Ecuador's violence may drive migrants to the U.S. if Noboa's policies fail. Haiti's delayed 2026 elections could lead to increased refugee flows to the Dominican Republic. A Colombian post-Petro government will likely influence the integration of Venezuelan migrants.
    • Geopolitical Alignments: The elections will shape U.S.-China competition. Milei's pro-Western policies contrast with those of Petro and Lula, who hold balanced positions. A rightward shift in Chile or Brazil could enhance U.S. influence, while leftist wins in Bolivia or Colombia may deepen Beijing ties. Nicaragua's 2026 election, likely rigged under Daniel Ortega, will reinforce authoritarian alliances with Russia and China.
    • UN Secretary-General Election: The 2026 UN Secretary-General election, for a term starting January 2027, coincides with this super-cycle. The UN Latin America and the Caribbean Group (GRULAC) would push for a regional candidate. However, ideological divides could fragment GRULAC's support, weakening its influence. Brazil and Colombia's election outcomes will determine whether GRULAC will support a progressive or pragmatic-oriented candidate. Holding elections in Barbados in 2026, rather than until 2027, could also have an impact on this process, given the status of Mia Mottley as a potential candidate for the office.
    • Regional Governance: The super-cycle will impact organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), Mercosur, CELAC, and CARICOM. A conservative shift in Chile or Brazil could strengthen market-oriented blocs, such as the Pacific Alliance, while leftist victories in Bolivia or Colombia might bolster the anti-imperialist stance of CELAC. Polarized outcomes, as in Bolivia, risk paralyzing regional cooperation. In the Caribbean, stable systems in Jamaica and the Bahamas support CARICOM; however, Haiti's electoral uncertainty could strain resources, potentially hindering trade and climate initiatives.

    By putting all these pieces together, the 2025–2026 electoral super-cycle in Latin America and the Caribbean can be seen as a defining moment, set against a backdrop of waning trust in democracy and rising openness to non-democratic alternatives. Presidents like Noboa, Milei, Boric, and Chaves, who overcame first-round losses to win runoffs, face intense scrutiny as their polarizing agendas are tested. The outcomes will shape regional governance, from OAS cohesion to CARICOM stability, while influencing global trade, migration, the UN Secretary-General race, and regional participation in global politics.

    As voters decide, the world watches whether this cycle strengthens democratic resilience or deepens division, with consequences for markets, climate goals, and international alliances.