By Javier Surasky
The key
question is: how can they reconcile their national interests with those of the
regions they lead, as well as with those of the broader group of emerging
powers?
To seek
answers, we focus on Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, proposing a
simplified—but we believe practical—framework to analyze the situation.
The model
we suggest is based on the tension regional powers face among the three poles
mentioned in our question: national interests, regional interests, and the
interests of the group of regional powers. The shifting pull of these different
poles over time can generate either trust and regional stability, or
inconsistency and a loss of confidence in the leading country from others in
its region.
When these
spheres overlap, they create three areas with four possible forms of
interaction, as illustrated below:
Illustration
1: Regional Powers – Tensions and Interest Projection Models
Source: Author's own elaboration
Only when
there is a situation of balance—or when regional interests are prioritized—can
the risk be avoided that a regional leadership role might be used by a middle
power to advance its interests or those of its group.
These
tensions, which are constant and subject to shifting dynamics, become a central
factor in shaping the foreign policy of regional powers and have an impact on
multiple scenarios, such as:
- The exercise of regional representation that these powers assume in global forums can blur the line between national and regional positions when not clearly differentiated.
- The use of a regional power’s international influence to shape agendas and priorities in regional mechanisms may lead to alignment with national interests.
- Mediation in regional disputes,
where a power’s political weight may help broker agreements but also
affect perceptions of its neutrality.
To navigate
these tensions, regional powers have employed a range of tools to sustain trust
in their leadership, including:
- Investment in infrastructure
and development cooperation, such as offering regional partners access to
their domestic markets, even when framed within reciprocal mechanisms of
economic integration.
- Fulfilling commitments agreed
at the regional level, as part of efforts to limit the use of their
comparative advantages over neighboring countries.
- Demonstrating consistency
between their global stances, including joint statements with other
regional powers, and their regional actions.
Using this
framework, we highlight several countries with prominent regional roles in
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and Africa:
Brazil is the most significant regional
power in South America and shares that status in Latin America and the
Caribbean with Mexico. Brazil’s consolidation as a regional leader occurred
mainly during Lula da Silva’s first administration (2003–2010), when it even
sought to extend its influence on Africa and project itself on a global scale.
Brazil
leverages the size of its domestic market, its productive capacity, and its
global leadership on environmental issues to strengthen its position in LAC.
Amid
favorable regional politics due to ideological alignment with neighboring
governments, Brazil was one of the architects behind the creation of UNASUR
(established in 2008 in Brasília), and a driving force in the process that led
to the creation of CELAC in 2011. Brazil also played a role in resolving
political crises in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Paraguay during that period.
This
leadership was also instrumental in forming the BRICS group in June 2009, where
Lula played a key role, and in securing Brazil’s position within the G20, which
sparked perceptions in the region that Brazil was leveraging its leadership in
LAC to pursue its national interests.
Brazil’s
leadership capacity was also affected by the shift in regional policy under
Jair Bolsonaro’s administration (2019–2022), though this was at least
temporarily reversed with Lula’s return to the presidency in January 2023.
Mexico, meanwhile, is constantly
influenced by its geographic proximity and economic ties with the United
States.
Like
Brazil, Mexico invested significant political capital in establishing CELAC,
seeking to create greater autonomy from the United States and reinforce its
commitment to Latin America and the Caribbean.
Its market
integration reflects its geographic position: to the north via NAFTA (now
USMCA), and to the south through its participation in the Pacific Alliance.
This dual alignment is a structural feature of Mexico’s international
positioning and the main factor affecting its leadership capacity.
Barbados presents a unique case. Despite
lacking significant economic or material resources, it has established itself
as a leader in the Caribbean, gaining broader regional prominence thanks to the
unity demonstrated by Caribbean nations in regional forums.
Much of
Barbados’s leadership is due to the diplomatic efforts of its current Prime
Minister, Mia Mottley, who has strongly and vocally represented the subregion’s
interests in three key areas: environmental protection and disaster response,
external debt, and calls for colonial reparations. The latter has helped build
ties with Africa, especially in light of the 38th African Union Summit (February 2025), whose theme was “Justice for Africans and People of
African Descent Through Reparations.”
Barbados
has also gained influence within the Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
group on this agenda. Unlike the other cases, its leadership is built on soft
power.
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country
and largest economy, in many ways comparable to Brazil in LAC. Though it has
continental reach, its primary sphere of influence is West Africa, where it is
the main driver of ECOWAS. Nigeria was also a key promoter of the African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
It has led
AU-backed peacebuilding efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Sahel region.
Its leadership, particularly among Anglophone countries, is substantial, though
it is viewed with suspicion by Francophone nations.
South
Africa competes
with Nigeria for leadership among Anglophone African countries, with the
advantage of stronger ties to Francophone states, based on its post-apartheid
reputation and Nelson Mandela’s legacy. However, persistent social inequality
and rising xenophobia have weakened its position.
South
Africa played a leadership role in transforming the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) into the current African Union (AU), a process formalized in Durban
in 2002. Like Brazil, it experiences tensions between regional priorities and
those of the BRICS, which it joined in 2010.
Algeria serves as a subregional power in
North Africa and the Sahel and is a key leader in Francophone Africa. Its power
lies in its status as an energy powerhouse and its vocal support for Western
Sahara’s self-determination, backed by the continent’s largest and
best-equipped army. This military has supported AU-led peace missions and made
Algeria a key partner in counter-terrorism. In 2004, the African Centre for the
Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in Algiers.
Algeria
also enjoys moral authority due to its history of conflict mediation and its legacy
of anti-colonialism. However, its historical rivalry with Morocco undermines
regional solidarity and remains the main obstacle to Maghreb integration.
Kenya is gaining regional relevance in
East Africa. Like Barbados, its strengths lie in soft power: it has become a
regional and global diplomatic hub, hosting UN and other international offices.
This diplomatic status could grow, given that the current UN reform process
(UN80) includes relocating institutions from Geneva and New York to Nairobi.
Kenya’s
diplomatic skills have been deployed in mediation efforts, including the recent
case in South Sudan. In recent years, it has used its influence to promote a
new African development model centered on innovation and digital opportunities,
attracting interest from other countries in the region.
The performances of these countries will shape the selection of the next UN
Secretary-General in 2026. It will be essential for Latin America and
the Caribbean to reach the broadest possible consensus on a candidate and
secure support from the African Group in the General Assembly. Strong
joint pressure from both regions on the permanent members of the Security
Council, particularly the “P3” (U.S., China, and Russia), could tilt
the balance in favor of a candidate—hopefully a woman—from Latin America
and the Caribbean, given that the P3 will likely need to compromise on “second
preferences” due to their mutual conflicts.