By Javier Surasky
During its 79th regular session, the General Assembly adopted its first two resolutions on Artificial Intelligence—a topic that has become increasingly present in recent general debates in recent years.
What can we
expect to be discussed on this issue in the 80th session? Which actors should
we pay special attention to? What could become the central points of
discussion? Let’s explore the landscape to assist those interested in the topic
in following the speeches during the upcoming General Debate.
We believe
three main issues will structure the discussion: models of AI governance, its
environmental footprint, and the rapid widening of the digital divide between
digitally central and peripheral countries.
Within
those topics, different positions will emerge regarding: resource metrics
(understood as concrete figures on electricity and water consumption by AI
systems); financing of digital capacity development—with references to
"Compute for All," "Green Gigafactories," "Digital
Commons Facility," and "AI for Sustainable Development"—seeking
to balance the burdens and opportunities between AI-leading countries and those
falling behind; and AI governance modes and forums, with potential
disagreements over whether to formally establish a UN Scientific Panel, a World
AI Cooperation Organization, or to give a greater role to the ITU. We may also
see debates on how best to articulate AI with the UN80 initiative, which
has thus far placed excessive expectations on what AI can deliver as part of a
broader UN reform.
A quick
mapping of countries and positions allows us to foresee the prominence certain
actors will acquire:
The European
Union will advocate for the regulation of AI in such a way that gives
states control over risks without halting progress, proposing a unified
combination of “standards and resource allocation.”
In this
regard, it will showcase to the international community its AI Act and the InvestAI
fund, endowed with €200 billion, €20 billion of which will be allocated to
building gigafactories (each hosting up to 100,000 chips to train AI models,
aiming to increase Europe's computing capacity while reducing carbon
emissions). This may lead to calls for transparency in water and energy use at
data centers.
The United
States will continue its “innovation first” approach—that is, AI regulation
must not hinder or slow AI progress. Recall that in a strongly worded speech at
the February AI Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance warned that “excessive
regulation could kill a transformative sector” and refused to sign the
declaration on “Inclusive
and Sustainable AI.”
Washington
will likely avoid referencing energy resource consumption, and if it does, it
may be to point an accusatory finger at China. It might also promote its cloud
services as the fastest route for developing countries to “leapfrog” over the
digital divide.
China will be the third major actor. It
is a given that it will defend a model of AI governance centered on state
sovereignty but cooperative in nature. Recall that the Global
AI Governance Action Plan, launched by Premier Li Qiang in July 2025,
suggests establishing a World AI Cooperation Organization within the UN system
and promoting the use of open-source platforms. Both elements could be
presented as opportunities for lagging countries to join the digital wave. It
is also expected to make strong reference to Western export controls on
AI-related chips.
India’s position may vary depending on how
U.S.-imposed sanctions for its Russian oil purchases evolve in the coming
weeks. It is almost sure that India will defend the general “AI for
Development” perspective. As a precedent, at the Paris AI Summit, Prime
Minister Modi called for “democratizing technology” and invoked G20 language on
energy-efficient AI at scale for the Global South. India may support calls for
increased concessional financing to develop green data center corridors,
especially in South Asia and Africa.
Kenya is leading Africa’s demand for
access to computing power. At a panel organized by the President of the General
Assembly and held in Kenya this past July, the Group of Friends for Capacity
Development in AI was established. Its position is that without
preferential access to cloud services and the promotion of renewable energy, AI
will deepen neocolonialism and dependency in the region. Kenya is expected to
link demands for digital justice and climate justice, possibly providing data
on how AI strains water resources in arid African areas.
Brazil will not only "open the
game" as the first country to deliver its speech, but we can be sure it
will connect AI governance to the climate agenda of COP30, which will be held
this year in Belém do Pará. Brazil is likely to support establishing global
standard rules on disclosing energy and water consumption for AI purposes. It
may propose allocating part of the Loss and Damage Fund to the development of
sustainable and resilient computing infrastructure. This position could be
joined by the Small Island Developing States (AOSIS), particularly Barbados,
calling for mandatory environmental impact assessments as part of the
implementation measures of the Global Digital Compact.
The Nordic
countries (Norway, Iceland, and Sweden) will aim to present
themselves as examples of green AI development, offering their abundant water
resources and low temperatures as incentives for the installation of
low-emission AI clusters in their territories.
Iraq, speaking on behalf of the G77 +
China, will once again call for greater technology transfers—including
digital technologies—more financing for AI development, digital infrastructure,
and human capacity. There is a strong likelihood that it will call for the
creation of a global solidarity mechanism. The digital divide and data
neocolonialism may also feature in its speech.
France
and Spain will
highlight their hosting of the AI Action Summit and the Fourth Conference on
Financing for Development. While aligned with the EU, they may include elements
suggesting the need for phased thresholds for computing and financial resource
transfers, as well as for providing concessional loans for the development of
"green AI." They may also advocate incorporating this issue into the
agendas of multilateral development banks.
Taken
together, these interventions reflect the contending positions around the
issues we identified as the current core of debate, intertwining development,
environmental stewardship, ethics, and international security—key components of
a contested roadmap toward digital development.