UN80: Transformative Reform or Veiled Continuity? Analysis of the Mandate Implementation Review Document

By Javier Surasky

The UN80 initiative, launched by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to mark the Organization’s 80th anniversary, proposes a comprehensive review of mandates issued by the UN’s intergovernmental bodies as part of a broader effort to achieve a more effective, efficient, coherent, flexible, and results-oriented United Nations.

As an essential step in this process, on July 31, the Secretary-General presented Member States with a document titled UN80 Initiative: Workstream 2 – Mandate Implementation Review, which, at least for now, does not present concrete reform measures, but instead outlines the preliminary reform framework that will guide the process.

According to the document Informal meeting of the General Assembly (plenary) on the UN80 Initiative on 24 June 2025, this workstream is dedicated to reviewing the extensive and complex landscape of mandates within the United Nations System in order to better guide the work of the System itself.

Far from meeting expectations, this document raises many doubts regarding the direction of UN80, its management, its real chances of success, and the level of institutional self-criticism involved.

Its central focus is on the rationalization of mandates, but the pathways it proposes do not seem credible, and the tools it suggests appear more like excuses than serious responses to the challenges ahead. This will likely increase internal discontent within the UN and possibly open new divides among Member States regarding the reform process.

Below, we contextualize the document and reference some of its key contents.

Since the document mainly addresses the rationalization of mandates and the avoidance of overlap between entities in the UN system, it is helpful to briefly explain the formal process by which mandates are created.

Formally, each mandate of a UN entity is adopted by Member States as part of the work of the Organization’s main bodies — whether the General Assembly, ECOSOC, or the Security Council.

In practice, however, the UN Secretariat plays a prominent role in determining mandates through three avenues:

Reports of the Secretary-General, which provide diagnoses, recommendations, and budgetary estimates, thereby framing the overall discussion on mandates;

Technical advice to delegations during negotiations, including specific language elements used in drafting mandates;

Analytical framing of international problems that justify the creation of mandates, often linked to reports produced by the Secretariat itself.

In summary, the Secretariat — and the Secretary-General in their role as the head of the Secretariat and chief administrative officer of the UN (Article 97 of the UN Charter) — not only implements mandates but also inspires, shapes, and in a sense, co-creates them alongside Member States.

Therefore, the emphasis in the SG’s newly released document on Member States' responsibility for the proliferation and overlap of mandates appears to be a way to sidestep self-criticism, despite ample evidence showing the Secretariat’s leading role in the origin and consolidation of this situation.

It is worth recalling that under the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (ST/SGB/2018/3), the Secretariat has mechanisms to recommend the elimination or consolidation of redundant actions and outputs. Notably, Rule 105.6 states:

In their budgetary submissions, heads of departments and offices shall provide the Secretary-General with a list of outputs and activities required by legislation or approved in a previous budgetary period that have not been included in the proposed programme budget because they are considered obsolete, of marginal usefulness or ineffective, and that therefore could be proposed for termination by the General Assembly. The determination of such outputs shall be made by applying, inter alia, the following criteria:

(a) Outputs and activities derived from mandates that are at least five years old, unless a relevant intergovernmental body has reaffirmed the continuing validity of the mandate;

(b) Outputs and activities whose legislative basis has been superseded by new mandates;

(c) Outputs and activities that were programmed as new outputs in the budget for the previous biennium but that were not implemented in that biennium; if such outputs are to be included in the budget, justification must be provided;

(d) Outputs and activities that, during the in-depth evaluation of a programme by the Committee for Programme and Coordination or a review of the programme by the relevant functional or regional intergovernmental organ, were found to be obsolete, of marginal usefulness or ineffective.

The Secretariat is at least partially co-responsible for the inefficiencies it now denounces — inefficiencies it seeks to place solely on the shoulders of Member States.

Nor can it be said that concern about overlapping mandates and the resulting inefficiencies took the UN by surprise. This is a longstanding issue, accompanied by various suggestions to include “sunset clauses” in new mandates (see, for example, resolution 52/12. Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, para. 26.e — from 1998!).

These precedents lead us to ask: how does UN80 differ from or resemble previous reform attempts?

Some distinguishing features include:

A systemic approach based on the full mandate life cycle;
Heavy emphasis on digital and data-processing capacities to support evidence-based reforms. While these technologies offer opportunities for improved mandate mapping, overlap identification, and evidence-based proposals, without a unified information system across entities, data will remain fragmented. This could mean technological solutions are proposed for political problems, disregarding the differing capacities of States (and individuals) to understand AI-managed processes, which may benefit large tech corporations and States with more advanced infrastructure and digital literacy, especially if non-explainable models are used, undermining transparency and legitimacy.
Efforts to construct a narrative based on impacts and results, referencing the 2030 Agenda and especially the Pact for the Future — even though austerity, efficiency, and financial-operational rationalization remain at the core.

Yet, there are also clear continuities with past failed reform processes, such as placing responsibility for outcomes solely on States (the aforementioned lack of self-criticism), trying to adapt the Organization’s work to the available funds (when it should be the other way around), and failing to integrate strong internal review mechanisms to ensure sustainability. Furthermore, the lack of transparency and poor internal communication about UN80 has created unprecedented levels of discontent among UN staff compared to past reform efforts.

The initiative’s evolution now depends on the positions taken by different actors with varying influence and objectives. Below is an initial mapping:

Actor	Main Role	Influence Level	Key Relationships
Secretary-General	Driver of the initiative and top UN administrative official	High	Supports Member States; coordinates Secretariat; proposes actions and holds administrative authority
UN Secretariat (DESA, DGC, EOSG, etc.)	Supports implementation and prepares reports	High	Provides data and inputs; implements mandates
Member States	Decide on mandates scope and duration	Very High	Accept or reject SG proposals; influence through diplomacy
Regional groups & coalitions	Coordinate political positions and voting	High	Align State positions
Major donors	Fund much of the system; impose conditions	High	Influence mandates design and shape efficiency logic
CEPA & other technical bodies	Offer independent assessments and recommendations	Medium	Provide technical insights for reform
Civil society / NGOs / academia	Indirectly shape debate; provide ideas and arguments	Low-Medium	Source of legitimacy and external pressure

We can organize the information gathered so far into a SWOT analysis:

Strengths	Weaknesses
* Systemic, integrated approach to mandate life cycles * Use of empirical evidence and modern technologies * Alignment with SDGs and Pact for the Future	* Avoids acknowledging Secretariat’s role in mandate proliferation * Lacks deep internal reform or institutional oversight mechanisms * Overly optimistic about technological potential, with no concrete justification * Austerity-driven agenda imposed by major donors
Opportunities	Threats
* Symbolic and political momentum from the 80th anniversary * Potential synergies with other reform processes (QCPR, Pact for the Future) * Improved accountability and institutional efficiency * Greater visibility for the UN through concrete results	* Political will of Member States not guaranteed * Divergent end goals between States and non-State actors * Institutional fragmentation hinders execution * Stalling of the reform process, exacerbated by SG’s limited time in office * Declining staff morale due to process mishandling

Based on previous positions and strategies, an Informed Foresight allows us to anticipate the following responses from key actors:

G77 + China: Likely to adopt strategic ambivalence — cautiously welcoming the framework but demanding objective criteria that reflect Global South interests and ensure full participation.
United States: May conditionally support the initiative, focusing on financing, efficiency, and budget oversight.
European Union: Might provide the strongest support and seek a leadership role in the reform process, though internal tensions among EU States could complicate this.
Russia: Expected to take a defensive stance, potentially undermining the framework if it does not receive assurances of preferential treatment as a permanent Security Council member.

As a conclusion, the SG document — still not a concrete reform proposal — suggests that the UN80 initiative is not far removed from earlier reform efforts: it lacks self-criticism from the SG, fails to clarify its supposedly integrated approach, overstates the benefits of new technologies, and assumes alignment with the Pact for the Future, which is not guaranteed and mirrors past claims of alignment with other global agendas.

Moreover, UN80 faces the same structural obstacles that limited previous reforms: sovereignty claims, resistance to change, financial pressures (some veiled), and neglect of regional-level reforms — from which it could learn valuable lessons (inter-agency clustering, report integration, shared back-office services).

To make matters worse, the timing of the UN80 proposal coincides with one of the UN’s most severe financial crises, suggesting the initiative may be more about financial cuts than a genuine attempt to reshape the Organization to meet 21st-century challenges.