Politics, Technology, and Trade: Impacts on Negotiations over the Global Governance of AI (a data-driven exercise)

By Javier Surasky


The regulatory regime governing artificial intelligence has become a strategic axis of contemporary global politics. Yet not all countries engage in the same way in multilateral discussions where the principles and standards for AI are being shaped.

For instance, at the United Nations—still the core of multilateral life despite its current pronounced weakness—some delegations co-sponsor resolutions, push for ambitious normative language, and participate in technical negotiations. Others, by contrast, are virtually absent from these dialogues.

Understanding why this difference exists helps clarify the extent to which global AI governance will be genuinely inclusive or remain concentrated in the hands of a few. Furthermore, this difference reveals how a feedback loop in the digital divide among countries has already begun to take shape.

To achieve this, we built an original database covering all 193 UN Member States, then tested several machine-learning models to detect consistent patterns in diplomatic participation in debates on the future of AI.

Our main challenge was the lack of an indicator for AI governance participation. We therefore used UN Member States’ actions in General Assembly debates on the two relevant resolutions: Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence Systems for Sustainable Development (A/RES/78/265) and Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain and its Implications for International Peace and Security (A/RES/79/239). From these, we built an engagement indicator by rating each country based on its role in these resolutions (presenting the draft = 1; co-sponsoring the draft = 0.5; adding co-sponsorship at adoption = 0.25; neither = 0). The mix of these roles yields values from 0 to 1 in 0.25 increments, reflecting levels of engagement across both resolutions.

First point to highlight: no State co-authored both resolutions.

To work with this conceptualization, and given the limited sample (193 cases), we reduced dispersion by applying a binary scheme: those who barely participate (0 or 0.25) and those who show more significant involvement (0.5, 0.75, or 1). This distinction reflects a familiar political logic in diplomacy: “joining for formality” is not the same as signing onto a resolution that stakes out a position in an emerging field.

With this dependent variable defined, we then constructed a set of predictors to represent dimensions which, according to our expert intuition, could influence diplomatic engagement: technological capabilities, institutional quality, international insertion, trade profiles, and membership in global coalitions.

To capture technological capabilities, we used indicators such as the level of digitalization, the e-government index, and the AI Readiness score.

For the institutional dimension, we included the democracy index, the rule-of-law strength, and moving averages of civil-liberty indices.

For international insertion, we incorporated each country’s level of trade dependence on the three major actors shaping AI governance (the United States, China, and the European Union), along with variables reflecting membership in groups such as the G77, BRICS, the G20, the OECD, or the European Union. The rationale is that AI governance is shaped by both domestic capacity and external dynamics that condition political incentives.

After a technical cleaning of the generated database, we assigned label roles to mark the expected outputs for the models. In an initial run, the country variable was marked as an identifier, and the participation variable related to the above-mentioned resolutions was the label. All other attributes were treated as regular features. The original co-sponsorship value was excluded to avoid “data leakage”, a situation in which the model reaches an artificially easy solution by relying on a single variable closely aligned with the target classification, thereby failing to use other variables.

We first used a decision tree for its interpretability, setting the Gini criterion and limiting depth for clarity. The resulting tree yielded 77.6% accuracy, and the variables with the greatest weight—those consistently appearing as main branches—were digitalization, democracy, rule of law, and AI-readiness metrics. In other words, the tree showed that countries participating more actively in AI governance tend to have strong digital infrastructure and high-quality institutional systems. Multilateral diplomacy is filtered through domestic political, governance, and technical capacities.

To contrast this interpretive structure, we ran a Random Forest model, which combines the statistical robustness of many trees with the ability to avoid overfitting. Accuracy remained high (74.1%), but the most relevant contribution was the improved observation of variable hierarchies. The five most influential predictors were digitalization, the e-government index, democracy, rule of law, and the Global AI Readiness Index. These reflect three distinct capability dimensions—digital, institutional, and technological—that converge toward a common tendency.

Trade dependencies and international bloc memberships played only secondary roles. This is important because it challenges simple, geopolitically driven views. Membership in G20, BRICS, or G7 alone does not predict which countries are active in AI governance.

As a more extreme contrast, we ran a decision tree using only levels of trade dependence on the three actors leading debates on AI governance. We found a strong relationship between trade with the EU and the likelihood of participation, but the model’s predictive capacity fell to 62%. This decrease is itself highly telling: comparing the three models shows that trade with one of the three competing governance poles has limited influence on the likelihood of active involvement in AI debates at the multilateral level, and global coalitions add little to predicting how engaged a State will be in these discussions.

What most differentiates participants from nonparticipants is their domestic capacity to understand, regulate, and leverage advanced technologies. If a State lacks digital infrastructure, strong institutions, or a minimal base of technical preparedness, its diplomats are less likely to play an active role in UN negotiations on AI.

This finding has deep political implications. It tells us that the future of global AI governance is being shaped in a space where countries with strong technological and institutional foundations dominate. The digital divide is not only technological-economic; it is regulatory, governance-related, and democratic. If the international community aspires for AI to be governed inclusively and for emerging standards to genuinely represent the diversity of global positions—which is far from being the case—it is as urgent as it is indispensable to strengthen these multiple capacities in countries with low involvement.

This analysis also shows that machine-learning models can help study international politics. They do not replace theory but reveal patterns that might go unnoticed. Here, trees and Random Forests empirically show that diplomatic participation in technological issues depends on domestic capacities to integrate those technologies. Participation relates more to governance, democratic strength, and political structures than to technical matters. Thus, AI not only reshapes the economy, but it also reorganizes the geography of normative power, reinforcing earlier arguments about the wider implications of these governance patterns. The results of our work are not a final verdict—nor were they intended to be—but rather a suggestion of alternative avenues to explore and generate evidence as debates on AI governance progress within the United Nations. They show how critical it is to pay attention to who is in the room—and who is not, tying back to the original concerns about inclusivity and participation.

These models clearly show that inclusion will not occur automatically as AI advances. It will require strategic investments in digital capabilities, credible institutions, and technical literacy within States.

Today, we see the most marginalized, least powerful, and institutionally weakest excluded from debates, even when they form coalitions. This exclusion widens the digital divide, shaped by governance logics and marked by silenced voices.

And the silences of today will echo in new forms of domination, vulnerability, and lack of protection for entire populations in the future, unless we act in the present.

 

Note:

Dataset: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qkNkChxt_KB0qG5lSkTZJGlGsNO4tw2Y/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=104299964405419065891&rtpof=true&sd=true

Metadata Dictionary: https://drive.google.com/file/d/18puchzw3RIOf_z1robzuIEQTq5aQuEQi/view?usp=sharing