By Javier Surasky-
This blog analyzes what's happening with the
Global Digital Compact (GDC), one of the documents to be adopted by the United
Nations Future Summit when it convenes in New York on September 22 and 23,
2024.
The GDC is conceived as an annex to the Future
Pact, the main political document the Summit is expected to approve.
Originally, it was thought that the GDC could function as a first step towards
establishing common grounds for global governance of digital technologies.
However, reality shows that, at best, it will end up creating a weak framework
for international cooperation in this field.
In a previous
entry, we've already referred to the origin and initial steps taken in
negotiating the GDC and analyzed its last officially shared version: the second
revision (Rev-2), presented on June 26 of this year. Subsequently, the
permanent representatives to the United Nations from Sweden and Zambia,
co-facilitators of the Pact's negotiation process, completed the consultation
process, whose original
timeline was already completely overdue. A new schedule
established that the consultation meetings for drafting a third
revision of the Global Digital Compact (Rev-3) would have their last
session on July 3.
In a decision that proved to be diplomatically
unwise, on July 12, the co-facilitators shared Rev-3 of the Pact with the
States and initiated a silence procedure for its adoption. On July 16, the
final date for submissions, several States and groups of States "broke the
silence": the European Union, the G77, the United States, Canada, New
Zealand, Australia, and the list goes on.
Here, the process begins to lose transparency:
- Unlike the Zero Draft of the Global Digital Compact and its revisions 1 and 2, Rev-3 was not officially made public. We know its contents from a "leak" following the breaking of the aforementioned silence procedure.
- No concrete timeline for future negotiations was established to achieve a text acceptable to all States.
- Non-governmental actors, whose participation in the negotiations had already been very limited, were completely excluded from any future formal action.
Within this fog, there are elements that we have
indirectly come to know, including the topics (and paragraphs) that have been
subject to complaints considered of greater substance, and therefore under
renegotiation:
- The Internet governance scheme, established in paragraphs 26 to 28 of Rev-3.
- The AI governance scheme, established in paragraphs 49 to 56.
- The mechanism for monitoring commitments made by States in the GDC, established in paragraphs 63 to 72.
We point out some particularly relevant changes
in Rev-3 of the Global Digital Compact. To simplify reading, we highlight in
red the texts eliminated from Rev-2 and in blue those incorporated in Rev-3,
grouping them by themes.
Definition of objectives:
The Pact establishes five objectives, and Rev-3
introduces changes in the wording of two of them, which are more than mere word
adjustments:
- Objective 4 has had two additions and is now worded as "Advancing responsible, equitable and interoperable data governance approaches." While the mention of responsibility is a point in favor, changing the objective from promoting data governance to promoting approaches to that governance considerably degrades the level of ambition.
- Objective 5 has been reduced and now calls for "Enhance international governance of artificial intelligence [previously: "of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies"] for the benefit of humanity."
Human Rights and Technology:
The place given to human rights throughout the
document was also the source of harsh criticism: Konstantinos Komiatis points
out that "Rev-3 has a lot of issues and creates many gaps that can easily
be exploited by any authoritarian government out there – the entire human
rights section, for instance, is a gift to any country that seeks to evade its
human rights obligations."
Paragraph 13 (a) presents the commitment to
"Establish and support national digital skills strategies, adapt teacher
training and education curricula and provide for adult training programmes for
the digital age. Our aim is maximum coverage of basic digital skills for as
many as possible [previously, “Our target is to achieve
at least 80 percent of persons with basic digital skills and at least 60
percent with intermediate or advanced digital skills”], while also
advancing intermediate or advanced digital skills.” The differences in
precision and certainty of the objective are notable.
There is a better reception of gender elements
and empowerment of women and girls, although with significant gaps, for
example, regarding their access to STEM careers.
Internet Governance:
Despite States declaring in paragraph 5 that
they remain committed "to the outcomes of the World Summit on the
Information Society (WSIS), reflected in the Geneva
Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action and the Tunis Agenda
for the Information Society," Specific references to the Internet Governance Forum, the Tunis Agenda and to NET's global principles for Internet governance
were removed from paragraph 27
There is greater receptivity to multiple actors,
but there is no clarity regarding how this should be operationalized beyond the
calls for participation that cannot be missing from any international document.
AI Governance:
This section shows the most changes between
Rev-2 and Rev-3 of the GDC, especially when presenting its commitments (Rev-3
§55 and 56):
- "(a) Establish, within the United Nations, an independent multi-disciplinary International Scientific Panel on AI [previously, “to conduct independent multi-disciplinary evidence-based impact and risk assessments”] with balanced geographic representation to promote scientific understanding through evidence-based impact, risk and opportunity assessments, drawing on existing national, regional and international initiatives and research networks ["and contribute to identifying knowledge gaps and areas of emerging opportunities and challenges."]."
- "(b) Initiate, within the United Nations, a [previously “an annual”] Global Dialogue on AI Governance involving governments and all relevant stakeholders [“to build shared understandings and emerging best practices on AI”] which could be informed by the work of the International Scientific Panel and which will take place in the margins of existing relevant UN conferences and meetings ["as well as the ITU AI for Good Summit"]."
- 56. We therefore request the President of the General Assembly to appoint at the 79th session of the General Assembly co-facilitators, one from a developed country and one from a developing country, to identify through an intergovernmental process and with consultations with other relevant stakeholders the terms of reference and modalities for the establishment and functioning [previously, "on the composition, functioning and review"] of the International Scientific Panel on AI and a [previously, “an annual”] Global Dialogue on AI Governance for the adoption by the General Assembly.
Each of the indicated changes removes precision
or scope from the decisions made, affecting their ability to become
operational.
Incredibly, the GDC does not include any
reference to the recent resolutions adopted in the General Assembly on AI
addressing this topic (A/Res/78/311,
closer to U.S. positions, and A/Res/78/265,
aligned with China's positions on the matter).
Peace and Security:
The reduction of references to humanitarian law
(§5) is concerning, coupled with the incorporation of the mention that the
Pact's principles do not reach the military field (§4).
When discussing the value of information
integrity, States recognize that digital and emerging technologies can
facilitate information manipulation and interference, negatively affecting
"the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the
attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals” [previously, “the enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the attainment of the
Sustainable Development Goals and amplify risks for
international peace and security”] (§32).
Data:
The beginning of Rev-2 paragraph 36, recognizing
“that data governance and data regulation have evolved
in uncoordinated ways, contributing to asymmetric concentrations of data and
capacities to use it” is deleted.
Paragraph 44 (d) is eliminated, where a commitment to data for environmental
protection was included.
Financing:
There are marked setbacks in financing for the
implementation of the objectives established in Rev-3.
- In paragraph 2, the reference to "closing digital divides will require adequate, sufficient and predictable means of implementation" was removed.
- Rev-3 includes mentions of "voluntary financing" of the efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in providing support and practical guidance on human rights and technology issues (Rev-3, §24) and has transformed the commitment to provide financially support the Internet Global Forum into one of voluntary provision of funds (§28(b)).
- The requirement for the Secretary-General “to establish a Global Fund for AI for Sustainable Development to catalyze the AI capacity-building that is required to bridge AI divides and promote AI- based solutions for the SDGs,” together with the request “to initiate consultations with potential public, private and philanthropic contributors and to report on progress on the Fund within 12 months” that were part of Rev-2, have become a timid invitation for the Secretary-General "to develop innovative financing options for consideration by the General Assembly, in the 79th session.”
New references to the needs of developing
countries have been included, among which the inclusion of a new principle of strengthening global partnerships "to ensure the
provision of the required means of implementation to developing countries
including the mobilization of financial resources, capacity-building and the
transfer of technology on mutually agreed terms" (§8 (l)) stands
out, it becomes an expression of good wishes based on other reforms, such as
the above mentioned.
When addressing the monitoring scheme for GDC
implementation, there is a general recognition of the importance of having
sufficient funding for the implementation of commitments, including an express
reference to "pooling of investments in joint and blended facilities(…) including
through United Nations mechanisms such as the Digital Window of the Joint SDG
Fund and financing from multilateral development banks," calling on
countries to increase their investments in digital technologies and data while
inviting the private sector and philanthropy to "consider making financial
commitments in support of the implementation of this Compact" (§66).
The Follow Up mechanism:
The main elements that member States establish to
follow up the GDC implementation are:
- States commit to assessing the Pact's progress towards its objectives and identifying emerging opportunities and challenges for global digital cooperation (§75).
- The system will function at a triple level: global, regional, and national, and should consider each country's specificities. Rev-3 adds an express statement to respect "national policies and priorities and applicable legal frameworks” (§63).
- The mechanism will include multistakeholder participation.
- The " role of the Commission on Science and Technology for Development in reviewing follow-up on the implementation of the outcomes of WSIS” is recognized (§69) and, along these lines, it is stated that they look forward to "WSIS+20 Review in 2025 to identify how WSIS processes can ["be strengthened to"] support implementation of the Compact” (§71).
- States highlight the Internet Governance Forum's role and invite it to hold an annual meeting aimed at facilitating the contribution of non-governmental actors to the implementation of the GDC (§70).
- A "High-Level Review of the Global Digital Compact" is convened, to be held during the 82nd session of the General Assembly with meaningful participation (here. the word "meaningful" is expressly used) of all relevant stakeholders, among which the Commission on Science and Technology for Development, the Internet Governance Forum, and the facilitators of the World Summit on the Information Society action lines are expressly mentioned. To this end, the President of the General Assembly is requested to appoint co-facilitators in the 81st session [previously, "80th session"] for conducting "open, transparent, and inclusive" intergovernmental consultations aimed at determining the modalities and periodicity of the High-Level Review of the Global Digital Compact (§75).
- States request the Secretary-General to prepare a report on progress, key trends, and advances in the implementation of the Pact during the 81st session, as input for the High-Level Review meeting (§76), provide governments and other stakeholders with an implementation map of the Pact (which) identifies possible objectives within a specified timeframe for their achievement" (§73) and to "operationalize modalities for voluntary endorsement of the Pact by December 2024” (§65).
- States affirm that they will build "on the processes emanating from the WSIS, including multistakeholder platforms such as the IGF and the WSIS Forum, to advance implementation of Compact commitments and actions”(§67), although there are no references to whether they intend to create indicators to monitor their progress.
Complementing these ideas, and without changes
from Rev-2, the need for active participation of multiple actors is
highlighted, without having managed to include a reference to a "meaningful"
participation. Stakeholders are invited to support the implementation and
monitoring of the GDC, which recognizes the contribution made by United Nations
system entities, especially ITU, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNESCO, and OHCHR, as well as
the support given by regional economic commissions to non-state actors (§68).
A highly renewed paragraph 72 requires the
Secretary-General to consult with Member States and develop a proposal to the
General Assembly during its 79th session for the creation of an office (the commitment to create this office was part of Rev-2 and
was eliminated, as was the reference to it serving "as a focal point for
States and non-governmental actors on digital and emerging technologies"
and facilitating coherent follow-up of the GDC) to which the activities
and resources of the current Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy on
Technology would be transferred: " This proposal should include detailed
information on operational functions, structure, location, mandate renewal,
resources and staffing."
Still, within the need to increase coordination,
States recognize “the role of the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable
Development and ECOSOC in reviewing the progress of the Compact in closing
digital divides and accelerating achievement of the 2030 Agenda” and “the role
of the UN Human Rights Council, within its existing
mandate, in fostering an inclusive, open, safe and secure digital space
for all.” The addition seems aimed at preventing the understanding of any GDC
support to a Council mandate expansion.
Conclusion:
In a comprehensive reading, Rev-3 presents more
continuities than reforms from Rev-2, which expresses the difficulties the
co-facilitators are facing in moving a word or modifying a concept without
collapsing the fragile architecture of the presented text.
Despite the lack of transparency in the negotiations that followed the rejection of Rev-3 by the States, it has transpired that negotiations are slow and difficult, with clashes between positions even within negotiating groups such as the G77+China, a confrontation of theses on the development of new technologies and AI between the United States and China, but also between these two and the European Union, more prone to applying restrictions, and developing countries, which seek to integrate the idea of AI as a global good.
Of the set of documents that the Future Summit
should adopt, this is undoubtedly the one facing the greatest risks of not
achieving consensus or, what has always turned out to be a bad deal, of
becoming a document of good wishes devoid of ambition and minimum operational
requirements. Meanwhile, opportunities will continue to remain in the hands of
a few, and risks will not have common frameworks that allow their control.
A quote from Jaron Lanier's book You Are Not
a Gadget comes to mind, which I dare to modify by adding just one word:
"The Turing test is a double-edged sword. You can't know if a machine has
become smarter or if you've simply lowered your own standards of human intelligence to such an extent
that the machine seems intelligent."
