Silence Broken. Revision 4 of the Global Digital Compact:

By Javier Surasky-

A new version of the Global Digital Compact, its 4th revision, was put under a silence procedure on August 27 by the co-facilitators of this document's negotiation process. Two days later, they announced that the silence had been broken, as had occurred with revision 3.

The disagreements presented by Syria, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and India cover both wording elements and omissions.

Regarding omissions, it has been requested that the Compact include previously accepted language on digital technology companies' respect for the national laws of the countries where they operate and that it explicitly mention the prohibition of applying unilateral coercive measures in digital cooperation. This latter issue brings a highly disruptive and unnecessary matter to the negotiations. Its mention seems to be a strategy to weaken the process rather than a genuine concern of those presenting it.

The paragraphs on which non-conformities have been presented, grouped thematically (and somewhat capriciously, as several could fall into multiple categories) are as follows:

Participation of multiple actors

  • Para. 8(a): establishes the principle of inclusive participation of all States and non-state actors as the basis of the Digital Compact (unchanged from Rev.3).
  • Para. 50: as part of the objective of improving international AI governance for the benefit of humanity, expresses the need to adopt a balanced, inclusive, and risk-based approach to AI governance, which must have full and equal representation of all countries "and meaningful participation of all stakeholders" (unchanged from Rev.3).
  • Para. 68 [Para. 67 of Rev.3]: refers to the system for following up and monitoring the implementation of the commitments agreed in the Global Digital Compact. The most relevant change introduced in Rev.4 is the removal of an express reference to the follow-up and monitoring process supported by the processes and forums resulting from the World Summit on the Information Society. Rev.3 added that it would include "multi-stakeholder platforms such as the Internet Governance Forum," which Rev.4 changed to "in particular, the Internet Governance Forum," without mentioning multi-stakeholder platforms. Rev.4 also adds a new final phrase where states express their interest in the WSIS+20 review in 2025 and invite it to identify "how these processes and Forums can support the contribution of all stakeholders to Compact implementation."

Human Rights

  • Para. 23(a): presents the commitment of States to "ensure that the development and implementation of national legislation relevant to digital technologies is compliant with obligations under international law, including international human rights law " (unchanged from Rev.3).
  • Para. 24: within the objective of fostering an inclusive, open, secure, and protected digital space that respects, protects, and promotes human rights, recognizes the efforts of OHCHR in providing human rights advice in the digital space and " practical guidance on human rights and technology issues to governments, the private sector and other stakeholders" (unchanged from Rev.3).
  • Para. 31(b) [Para. 30(b) of Rev.3]: in the framework of promoting digital trust and security, expresses the commitment of States to prioritize the development and application of national online child safety policies and standards in accordance with international human rights law, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Acceleration of progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals

  • Para. 11(c) refers to the development of digital infrastructures, with emphasis on space satellites and local network initiatives, promoting [in Rev.3 "prioritizing"] equitable access to satellite orbits, taking into account the needs of developing countries," to achieve universal access "at affordable rates, and at sufficient speeds as well as reliability to enable meaningful use of the Internet.” The reference to "affordable prices" is introduced in Rev.4.

Internet governance

  • Para. 27: Rev.4 mentions that this governance should be multi-stakeholder, which was not mentioned in Rev.3.
  • Para. 28 [Para. 27 of Rev.3]: This "new" paragraph in Rev.4 is a split of paragraph 27 in Rev.3 and is limited to recognizing the importance of the Internet Governance Forum as the leading multi-stakeholder platform for discussing World Wide Web governance issues.
  • Para. 29(d) [Para. 28(d) of Rev.3]: calls for not interrupting the Internet or adopting measures that affect network access, ensuring that any restriction imposed conforms to international law. Rev.4 eliminates the express mention of respect for the principles of "legality, necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination" that should guide any restriction on Internet access. Removing the reference to "non-discrimination" is the key to the objections presented to this paragraph.

Security and trust in digital technologies

  • Para. 30 [Para. 29 of Rev.3]: introducing the topic of digital security, countries affirm here the need to respond to all forms of violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, that occur or are amplified by the use of technology all forms of hate speech and discrimination, misinformation and disinformation, cyberbullying, and child sexual exploitation and abuse. To this end, they promise to establish and maintain risk mitigation and remediation measures that protect privacy and freedom of expression (unchanged from Rev.3).
  • Para. 31(d) [Para. 30(d) of Rev.3]: ensures that laws and regulations on the use of technology "in areas such as surveillance and encryption, are in compliance with international law." There are several underlying problems here, including the fact that respect for human rights is implicit as part of international law and elements related to international trade and security in sensitive areas, such as facial recognition technologies (unchanged from Rev.3).

Information and data integrity

  • Para. 35(e) [Para. 34(e) of Rev.3]: refers to the action of promoting access to credible and accurate information during crises as a way to protect and empower "those in vulnerable situations" [in Rev.3 it spoke of "people in vulnerable situations"].
  • Para. 39(d) [Para. 38(d) of Rev.3]: ensures that the collection, access, sharing, transfer, storage, and processing of data are secure and proportional to the purposes that lead to their collection and management, which must be necessary, explicit, and legitimate under international law (unchanged from Rev.3).
  • Para. 45(b) [Para. 44(b) of Rev.3]: on data for development, expresses the commitment of States to increase their efforts to gather, analyze, and disseminate relevant, accurate, reliable, and disaggregated data that allow better monitoring and policy formulation to accelerate the achievement of the 2030 Agenda while safeguarding privacy. It sets the goal of increasing by 50% the data available for monitoring the SDGs that are disaggregated by income, sex, age, race, ethnicity, migration status, disability, and geographic location "and other relevant characteristics in national contexts" (unchanged from Rev.3).

AI Governance

  • Para. 55(a) [Para. 54(a) of Rev.3]: on the commitment to "assess the future directions and implications of AI systems and promote scientific understanding" (unchanged from Rev.3).
  • Para. 55(b) [Para. 54(b) of Rev.3]: reflects the commitment to support the interoperability and compatibility of AI governance approaches through exchanges of good practices and the promotion of a shared conception (unchanged from Rev.3).
  • Para. 56 [Para. 55 of Rev.3]: expresses the commitments to establish within the UN an independent and multidisciplinary international scientific group on AI " with balanced geographic representation to promote scientific understanding through evidence-based impact, risk and opportunity assessments, drawing on existing national, regional and international initiatives and research networks" and to initiate, also within the UN, a global dialogue on AI governance involving governments and all relevant stakeholders. Rev.4 only removes here an express reference that the dialogue could draw from the work of the international scientific group.
  • Para. 57 [Para. 56 of Rev.3]: with minimal formal changes from Rev.3, this paragraph requires the President of the 79th Session of the General Assembly to appoint co-facilitators for an intergovernmental process that, in consultation with other actors, establishes the terms of reference, working modalities, and functions of the scientific group and for the global dialogue mentioned in the previous paragraph, and submit them for approval to the General Assembly.

Financing

  • Para. 63 [Para. 62 of Rev.3]: this paragraph shows relevant modifications compared to its previous wording. In Rev.4 it establishes that States "emphasize the importance of increasing investments [previously, they "encouraged" increasing investments], particularly from the private sector and philanthropy, to scale up AI capacity building for sustainable development [Rev.4 removes an express mention of supporting the development of this capacity "especially in developing countries"]. The Secretary-General is requested [in Rev.3, he was "invited," so now the term is stronger], "in consultation with potential contributors and the UN system" - an expression that was not in Rev.3, to develop "innovative options for voluntary financing for AI capacity building," where the inclusion of the word "voluntary" is new as it was not in Rev.3. Also new in Rev.4 is the request that, in developing proposals, the SG take into account "the recommendations of the High-Level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence on a Global Fund on AI." The new financing options the SG will propose should be "complementary to relevant United Nations financing mechanisms." There are no changes in the mandate, and the SG proposals should be presented to the General Assembly during the 79th period of sessions (2024-2025).

Follow-up and monitoring of commitments

  • Para. 69 [Para. 68 of Rev.3]: on the system for following up and monitoring the implementation of the commitments agreed in the Global Digital Compact, introduces a change from Rev.3, which recognized contributions from the main UN system entities linked to digital technologies (ITU, UNCTAD, UNDP, and UNESCO) requested them to support the implementation of the Global Digital Compact, "particularly in relation to actions to close digital divides" and expressly recognized OHCHR's support for the implementation of the Compact in terms of respect, protection, and promotion of human rights. All of this has become in Rev.4 an invitation to the system mentioned above entities and OHCHR to support the implementation of the Global Digital Compact "within their existing mandates."
  • Para. 74 [Para. 75 of Rev.3]: calls for a high-level meeting, titled "High-Level Review of the Global Digital Compact," to be held during the 82nd session of the General Assembly (2027-2028), based on a status report to be prepared by the SG " with the input and meaningful participation of all stakeholders” [in Rev.3 "with meaningful participation from all relevant stakeholders," that is, the reference to "input" from stakeholders is added, and the qualifier "relevant" that was imposed on these is removed].

A quick review of the issues and paragraphs that have been the subject of claims by member States clearly shows that:

  • 1. The most significant concerns are political and not technical.
  • 2. The problems focus on traditional sensitivity (human rights, stakeholder engagement, decision-making process openness, and transparency) and only partially on new challenges specific to the digital world and AI.
  • 3. The issue of financing the governance of digital technologies, including AI, and the development of infrastructures and capacities required for their use are not the focus of significant obstacles to the advancement of the Digital Compact.
  • 4. Even though the Summit of the Future was presented as an opportunity to equip multilateralism with tools to accelerate the advancement of the SDGs, references to these objectives are of residual interest.

Reading Rev.4 of the Global Digital Compact and the paragraphs where work is still needed to achieve a consensus with a low level of ambition, I remember that the co-facilitators of the negotiation process of the then "post-2015 Agenda" devoted a prolonged first stage of work to creating understanding among countries about what was at stake. How necessary it would be today to take that lesson and bring it back to international negotiation processes where some countries seem to not fully understand the enormous opportunities and threats of the material they have on the table for the future of the planet.