By Javier Surasky-
[Attention: this is a
longer than usual post]
This is our sixth post analyzing the Second Revision of the Pact for the Future (PfF, Rev-2). In the first one, we referred to the PfF coherence and the preamble; in the second, we analyzed the reforms in Chapter 1 on sustainable development and financing for development; the third focused on Chapter 2 on peace and security; the fourth on Chapter 3 on science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation, and the fifth on Chapter 4 on youth and future generations.
This new post focuses on the
last and longer Chapter 5 of the PfF: “Transforming Global Governance,” As in the
previous chapters, this one is structured with an introductory paragraph,
actions, and decisions attached to each action. In Rev-2, the Chapter includes 18
Actions, among them one on the Security Council reform still to be framed (#42) and 57 decisions.
To help the readers, the
text added in Rev-2 is highlighted in blue, and deletions in orange.
Chapter 5 Introduction
Paragraphs 64 and 65 of the PfF introduces
this topic. The first starts by recognizing that the multilateral
system despite its achievements in the past eighty years, is under unprecedented
strain. Then, “without
strengthened and reinvigorated multilateralism, [previously “without fundamental changes to our multilateral institutions,
a recognition of the need for”] greater
international cooperation, and an unwavering commitment to the Charter and
international law, global challenges could overwhelm and threaten all of
humanity.”
As a result, the transformation in global governance
is considered “essential to
ensure that the positive progress we have seen across all three pillars
of the United Nations’ work in recent decades does not unravel.” Member States
promise they “will not allow this to happen.”
Consequently, States affirm in paragraph 65 that they
“must renew [“people’s”] trust in global institutions.” How? “by making
them more representative of today’s world and more effective at delivering on
the commitments that we have made to one another and our people.” This is an
exciting reform: in Rev-1, the aim was to renew people’s trust in global
institutions, but in Rev-2, it is States trust that must be renewed.
Hence, Member States “renew” their “commitment to multilateralism, international
cooperation, guided by the principles of trust, equity, solidarity and
universality” and announce that they “will transform global governance and
strengthen the multilateral system” to help achieve “a world that is safe, [“more”] peaceful, [“more”]
just, [“more”] equal, [“more”]
inclusive, [“more”] sustainable, and [“more”] prosperous” (§65).
Chapter 5 Actions and “Decisions”
Action 41. Transform global governance and
reinvigorate the multilateral system to tackle the challenges, and seize the
opportunities, of today and tomorrow.
This action goal is “to make the
multilateral system, with the United Nations at its centre” more effective,
prepared for the future, just, democratic, equitable, representative,
inclusive, interconnected, and financially stable. With minor changes in
wording, this repeats Rev-1 action #36. The decisions under this action are
barely actionable descriptions of what that multilateralism would look like:
“(a) Effective and capable of delivering on
our promises, with strengthened accountability and implementation [previously, “compliance”] mechanisms to
ensure our commitments are met and to rebuild trust in global institutions.”
Adding “implementation” makes this decision more action-oriented. However, it
is hard to understand why States decided to erase “compliance,” which is much
needed.
“(b) Prepared for the future, building
capabilities and harnessing technology and data to anticipate risks, seize
opportunities, act early and manage uncertainty.” No changes between Rev-1 and
Rev-2 on this decision.
“(c) Just, democratic, equitable and representative of today’s
world to ensure that all Member States can meaningfully participate in global
decision-making in multilateral institutions, especially developing countries, including through
multilingualism, gender parity and balanced geographic representation.” The three final addition makes more precise what States means by “representative” at the beginning of the sentence. However, its positions seems to refer them to “meaningful participation,” which
only have strong links with the reference to multilingualism.
“(d) Inclusive, to allow for the meaningful participation of
relevant
stakeholders [previously, “a diverse
range of actors beyond States”], while reaffirming the intergovernmental
character of the United Nations and the unique and central role of States in
meeting global challenges.”
“(e) Interconnected, to ensure that the
multilateral system can draw together existing institutional capacities, work better as a system, overcome
fragmentation and comprehensively address multidimensional, multisectoral
challenges, while maximizing efficiencies.” This decision is key. Here Member States provides a “short-list” of
what the multilateral system require to be more effective, which is, at least
in our view, the raison d’etre of the Summit of the Future. From that
perspective, this and the following decision are the most relevant decisions
included in the entire PfF.
“(f) Financially stable, by ensuring
adequate, sustainable and predictable financing for the United Nations, and to
that end we commit to meet our financial obligations in full, on time and
without conditions.” Without any reform, this decision is, as we just said, of
maximum relevance. Without funding it adequately, there will be no chance of strengthening multilateralism, which means adequate, sustained, predictable,
and timely resource provision. Moreover, the reference to unconditionality
would be linked to the vast problem caused by “earmarked funds” that impede the
UN from using existing resources more efficiently. Nevertheless, this decision
refers to current financial obligations, which is the first step. Still, considering that the UN Member States recognize in the PfF the unprecedented
level of pressure on the global system, funding would not only increase but
rocket.
Action 42: Reform of the Security Council
The PfF process Cofacilitators include here the following note that we
can compare with the note in Rev-1: “It is clear from Member State and stakeholder inputs that reform of the
Security Council remains a priority for the Summit of the Future, and we are
committed to achieving an ambitious outcome in the Pact for the Future. We will
present [“initial”] language on this issue as soon as possible in light of ongoing deliberations in other UN fora. [previously, “in June 2024”]. To clarify, States could not
find consensus about this thorny and sensitive issue, not even for an initial
wording, within the cofacilitators' expected timeframe. Expectations on this
issue, if any, are going lower and lower.
Action 43. Increase our efforts to revitalize the work of the General Assembly.
With no news concerning the Security Council's
(im)possible reform, the attention turns to the UNGA. Member States “reaffirm the central position of the General Assembly as the chief
deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations”
(§67), and States decide to:
“(a) Further enhance and make full use of the
role and authority of the General Assembly to address evolving global
challenges, in full compliance with the Charter.” No changes between rev-1 and
Rev-2.
“(b) Enhance ways in which the General
Assembly can contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security
and further strengthen its coordination with the Security
Council, in particular by taking action, including preventive actions, to maintain international
peace and security [previously, “on threats to international peace and security”]. This is a delicate change in wording, seeking to avoid expressly allowing the
UNGA to act in case of threats to peace and security. The decision becomes more
open to interpretations than before.
“(c) Ensure that the selection and appointment process
of the Secretary-General is guided by the principles of merit, transparency,
inclusiveness and regional rotation and take into
account during the next, and in subsequent, selection and appointment processes
the regrettable fact that there has never been a woman Secretary-General.” Without introducing reforms, this decision merges the text of Rev-1 decisions (c) and (d).
Action 44. Strengthen the Economic and Social Council to accelerate the achievement of the 2030 Agenda.
In Rev-1, instead of referring to the 2030
Agenda, this action mentioned the acceleration of the achievement of the SDGs. Following
considerations on the UNGA revitalization, now is the moment for the ECOSOC.
Introducing this action, States “commit to strengthening the work of the Economic and Social Council as a
principal organ for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and
recommendations on across
all three dimensions of sustainable development implementation of the 2030
Agenda [previously, “issues of economic and social
development, with the aim the of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals”]. A wording change that extends the action reach to the entire 2030 Agenda, which
means chapters different than the one defining the SDGs, principles, monitoring
and follow-up mechanism, and means of implementation.
Member States decide to:
“(a) Continue to strengthen (previously, “strengthen”] cooperation between the Economic and Social
Council and both the Security Council and Peacebuilding Commission in accordance with
their respective mandates,
and between the Economic and Social Council and the international financial
institutions.” The only addition is, in fact, an unnecessary clarification of
terms.
“b) Facilitate more structured, meaningful
and inclusive engagement of non-governmental organizations in consultative
status with the Economic and Social Council in the activities of the Council.”
No changes between rev-1 and Rev-2.
“(c) Support [previously,
“Take steps towards granting formal status and a
stronger mandate to”] the Council’s youth forum to enhance youth
engagement throughout the Council’s cycle, ensuring that the forum is a
platform for youth from across all regions to continue to share their ideas and
engage in dialogue with Member States.” This decision would fit better in Chapter 4 on youth and future
generations. The first modification softens the States' will to have a youth
council by erasing the references to its formal status and a stronger mandate. The inclusion of the last part of the sentence seems to limit the youth council's
mission to “dialogue” with Member States.
“(d) Explore options to revitalize [previously,
“revitalize”] the Commission on the Status of
Women to ensure that the
Commission is fit for purpose [previously, “to promote the full and effective implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, to achieve gender equality, the empowerment, and
the human rights of all women and girls”]. The first reform makes the decision weaker, while there are two ways to read
the second reform: Positively, the purpose of the Commission on the Status of
the Women goes beyond the deleted enumeration of tasks and now the decision
reaches them all; negatively, now the decision is less specific and does not
include the express mention of critical international documents, which is a way
to recommit with them.
Finally, a Rev-1 decision requesting the
Secretary-General to provide recommendations for the consideration of the
ECOSOC on “how to ensure that the modalities,
functions, working methods and procedures of the Commission are
fit for the future” is erased.
Action 45. Strengthen the Peacebuilding Commission.
States introduce this
action affirming their commitment to strengthening
the Peacebuilding Commission through the 2025 review of the peacebuilding
architecture, intending to bring “a more strategic approach and greater
coherence and impact to
national and international peacebuilding efforts” (§69). Then, they
decide to:
“(a)
Enhance the role of the Commission as a platform for building [previously, “conflict
prevention”] and sustaining peace, including through sharing good practices among
Member States and mobilizing political and financial support for national
prevention and
peacebuilding efforts, in particular to avoid a possible relapse into conflict.” The only significant change here is the
deletion of conflict prevention, since it is not equal to peacebuilding.
“(b) Make greater use of the Commission to
support Member States progress their nationally-owned peacebuilding and prevention efforts and
strengthen the Commission’s advisory, bridging and convening role, and facilitate the inclusion of stakeholders’ perspectives on peacebuilding, including through
dialogue with civil society actors, in accordance with the Commission’s mandate.” This wording combines decisions (b) and
(c) in Rev-1. As in the previous decision, we see an
increased focus on peacebuilding. The
added text at the end of the paragraph's last part seems redundant.
“(c) Establish more systematic and strategic partnerships between the
Commission and international,
regional and sub-regional organizations, including the international financial institutions,
to strengthen peacebuilding efforts and to mobilize financing for sustaining peace and to help align national
development, peacebuilding and prevention approaches (previously,
“strategies”].”In the Rev-1 formula, this decision was oriented to IFIs, but now it
includes any other organization and it is expanded to comprehend regional and
sub-regional levels.
“(d) Ensure the
Commission plays a vital support role to countries during and after the
transition of a peace operation, in cooperation with the Security Council and supported by United Nations Country Teams, upon the request of
the country concerned.” The two modifications in the text aim to increase national
ownership, reinforcing the States’ sovereignty principle as a limit to the Commission's
capacity of action.
Action 46. Strengthen the United Nations system.
This
action went through relevant reforms. To begin, Rev-1 was formulated as “Reform and strengthen
the United Nations.”
In its actual form, States “underline the importance of the United Nations system remaining effective, efficient and
impactful.”
“(a) Support the
Secretary-General to achieve a more agile, responsive and resilient United
Nations, including [“on financial and management issues”] through implementing the UN 2.0 vision of enhancing the Organization’s capabilities in
innovation, data analytics, digital transformation, strategic foresight and
behavioral science to better support Member States and deliver on its mandates.”
With minor changes in its wording, this decision merges Rev-1 decisions (a) and
(b). Nevertheless, the deletion of the “financial and management issues” from
the text reduces, as happen across Rev-2, a concrete reference to financial and
financial-related issues.
(b) “Strengthen [“and sustainably fund”] the
United Nations development system, including the Resident Coordinator system,
to make it more strategic,
responsive, collaborative and integrated in supporting developing countries
achieve the 2030 Agenda [previously, “to
effectively support countries to meet their sustainable development ambitions”]
and [“ensure it can address”] address new and
emerging challenges, in line
with nationally-owned plans, through sustainable and predictable funding.”
The initial reference to “sustainable funding” was moved to the end of the
decision, adding the word “predictable.” The “effective support” to countries
effort to meet their “development ambitions,” rarely not “the SDGs,” is now disaggregated
in concrete actions. The reference to States’ sovereignty as a limit to the UN
System action reappears, similar to what we highlighted in action 45.
Rev-2 includes two new decisions attached to this action:
“(c) Ensure accessibility and disability inclusion at the United
Nations to allow for the full, meaningful and effective participation and
equality of persons with disabilities in all aspects of the United Nations’
work.”, demonstrating one more time that
the situation of persons with disabilities is a cross-cutting reference across
the PfF.
“(d) Ensure
the transparent and inclusive selection process of United Nations’ executive
heads and senior positions, taking into account the principles of equitable
geographical representation and gender balance and adhere to the general rule
that there should be no monopoly on senior posts in the United Nations system
by nationals of any State or group of States.” This decision represents the acceptance of a
long-overdue developing countries' claim. The UN story has taught us that it
will be difficult to implement.
Action 47. Strengthen the United Nations’ human rights pillar to ensure the effective enjoyment by all of all human rights and respond to new and emerging challenges.
Reminding the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the thirtieth anniversary of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, Member States introduce this action committing to “actively promoting
and protecting all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural
rights. This includes the right to development.” It strikes me when States commit to “all”
human rights but then they say “including civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights.” For me, it is the best way to identify how weak their real
commitment is. However, it is only a personal appreciation.
Member Stats also "recommit” to realize their obligations to respect, protect and fulfill [previously, “uphold”] human rights and to implement all relevant
international human rights instruments.”
The specific inclusion of the right to
development, and the mention of the obligations of protecting, promoting, and
fulfilling human rights obligations, but not the obligation of guaranteeing,
are aligned with decision 7(a). Besides, using the word “implement” instead of
“fulfill,” as the UN Human Rights bodies usually do, would better reflect the
obligation content.
“All human rights are universal, indivisible,
interdependent and interrelated, and the Sustainable Development Goals both depend on the protection of
and seek to achieve all human rights. Human rights defenders must be protected [previously, “protected and supported as important partners in achieving
our collective commitments”] from any form of intimidation and reprisals, both online and offline.”
Sadly, the commitment to support human rights defenders is deleted from Rev-2.
In the final part of this action introduction,
States explain they “Must
continue to uphold human rights in the future” by strengthening their capabilities
“to respond to new and emerging domains in human rights [previously, “to respond to the negative impact of new technologies,
poverty and inequality, climate change and environmental degradation, and
threats to international peace and security in human rights”]. The
action presentation in Rev-2 is, without any doubt, weaker and more restrictive
than in Rev-1.
Moving to decisions, Member States decide to:
“(a) Strengthen the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations human rights
mechanisms to enable them
to effectively carry out their mandates to respond to the broad range of human
rights challenges facing the international community, including new and
emerging challenges in the future, with impartiality, objectivity and
non-selectivity.” The addition is probably the result of years of the G77 and the
Western countries' group reciprocal accusations of applying double standards
concerning human rights.
“(b) Request the Secretary-General to provide
proposals for adequate, sustainable and predictable financing of the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations’ human
rights mechanisms, with the aim of steadily and significantly
increasing the resources [previously, “significantly increasing
the resources over
the next five years”] including from the regular budget, for the efficient and effective
execution of their mandates.”
Interestingly, the resource allocation commitment is still there, but the
timeframe is missing.
“(c) Enhance coordination and cooperation among United Nations entities working on
human rights and avoid duplication of activities, including through closer coordination with [previously, “cooperation between”] the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [“and all relevant United Nations organs, bodies and entities”]. Here, we see some changes in wording that do not affect the substance of the
decision.
Action 48. Accelerate reform of
the international financial architecture
In Rev-1, this
action was “Continue to reform the governance of the international financial
architecture so that it
reduces inequities and reflects today’s world. While Rev-2 wording uses the words “accelerate
reform” instead of “continue to reform,” which is a good sign of the urgency,
by erasing the final part of the sentence it misses the requested reform goals.
There are many
reforms in the decisions under this action, which splits into two actions in
Rev-2 (#48 and 49) a unique action in Rev-1 (#43).
In Rev-2, States
start voicing that they will “reform
of the international financial architecture [to
adequately meet the scale of the sustainable development challenges we face] is an
important [previously “crucial step”] step
towards building greater trust in the multilateral system [previously, “greater global solidarity and trust in multilateralism”].”
Losing Rev-1 reference to “adequately meet the scale of
the sustainable development challenges we face” is a big step back, just
as the deletion of an express mention of the urgency of
the reform that we can find in Rev-1 but not in Rev-2.
States continue with a new
paragraph in Rev-2: “We
commend ongoing reform efforts and call for even more urgent and ambitious
action to ensure that the international financial architecture becomes more
efficient, more equitable, fit for the world of today and responsive to the
financing needs of developing countries. The reform of the international
financial architecture must place the 2030 Agenda at its centre, with an
unwavering commitment to investing in the eradication of poverty in all its
forms and dimensions”. Putting the 2030 Agenda as a reference for the
financial architecture reform is a way to remediate having deleted its goals
from the action wording. These goals reappear here under the form of
establishing a “more
equitable, fit for the world of today” financial architecture, that now
is called to be also “more
efficient” and “responsive
to developing countries financial needs.”
Only one decision is
attached to this action in Rev-2:
Finally, an entire
paragraph that was part of this action In Rev-1 and the two decisions attached
to it, are moved into the new Rev-2 action 49.
Action 49. Accelerate reform of the governance of the international
financial architecture to address existing inequities so that it is
representative of today’s world.
This action seems new but, as we said, is based on reforming the
Rev-1 action 43.
Here, Member States “acknowledge the important role of the United Nations in global
economic governance, while fully respecting existing governance mechanisms and
mandates independent of the United Nations that preside over specific
organizations and rules” and “welcome the initiative to convene a Biennial
Summit at the level of Heads of State and Government to strengthen existing and
establish more systematic links and
coordination between the United Nations and the international financial
institutions,” stressing “the importance of inclusive participation.”
Then, they “recognize
the importance of continuing to pursue [previously, “recognize the necessity of”] governance reforms at the
international financial institutions and multilateral development banks,
especially the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to “strengthen
trust, improve access to financing and enhance the representation of developing
countries, including in
leadership positions.”
In addition to “changes
to quotas and voting power,” Member States “welcome other steps to improve the voice and
representation of developing countries, such as the creation of a twenty-fifth
chair on the IMF Executive Board for sub-Saharan Africa.”
Comparing the current text with the Rev-1, we find many phraseology
changes. However, there are three relevant changes to focus on: the express
mention of improving developing countries' access to leadership positions at
the IMG and the WB, the added reference to modifications in quotas and voting
power, and the inclusion of the long-time claim from African countries to have
a chair in IFIs Executive Boards.
The two decisions under this action were part of Rev-1 action 43, now
slightly modified
“(a)
Call on the board of the IMF to take further steps to enhance the representation and voice of developing countries to better reflect the current
global economy and to help the IMF deliver its mandate more effectively,”
which helps to frame the expected changes.
“(b) Call on the Executive Boards
of the World Bank and other multilateral development banks to ensure robust
representation (previously,
“to enhance representation”] and voice of
developing countries.” The call now uses stronger diplomatic vocabulary.
Action 50. Accelerate reform of the international financial
architecture to mobilize adequate financing [previously, “volumes of
capital”] to meet the Sustainable
Development Goals, respond to the needs of developing countries and direct financing to those
most in need.
This
action also went through significant reforms.
A direct statement opening this action in Rev-1
was erased: “Developing countries lack access to affordable
long-term financing. The Sustainable Development Goals will not be met unless
we close the financing gap.”
Now, Member States begin to explain they are “deeply concerned”
about the fact that “at this critical moment, developing countries lack access to
adequate financing from all
sources [“previously only “finance”] to
achieve the SDGs.” Moreover, they recognize that “flows of capital to
developing countries are falling, and more capital is leaving countries than is
coming in.” That is why “Multilateral development banks play a vital role in “supporting
sustainable development and the achievement of the SDGs and are critical to
increasing countries’ access to affordable finance and helping to unlock
private sector investment.” It is remarkable that, in Rev-1, this last
part was introduced by the words “We agree,” which
are no longer in the text, together with mentions of “expanding
countries’ access to affordable capital.”
Then, Member States “welcome
ongoing reform efforts of the multilateral development banks to mobilize
adequate financing for the 2030 Agenda, recognizing that further reforms
of the Banks are urgently needed, in addition to the strengthening of domestic resource mobilization,
and the domestic policy and regulatory environment,” and decide to:
“(a) Deliver a robust
twenty-first replenishment of the International Development Association
(IDA), including contributions from both new and existing donors that
significantly increase IDA’s resources, and establish a clear pathway to larger
IDA funding by 2030.” With changes in wording, this decision was part of Rev-1
and is still in Rev-2.
“(b) Call upon [previously, “encourage”] multilateral development banks to accelerate
the pace of reforms to their missions and visions, incentive structures, operational
approaches, and financial capacity to consider more ambitious steps to increase the availability of
finance to developing countries and to better address global
challenges.”
“Call upon” is, of course, less actionable than “encourage.” The issues to be
reformed are now listed in the decision, and also the main reform goal.
“(c) Call upon
the boards and management of
multilateral development banks to unlock additional finance from their own
balance sheets by fully
implementing the relevant recommendations from the G20 Independent Review of
Multilateral Development Banks’ Capital Adequacy Frameworks by the end of
2026, including leveraging callable capital and issuing hybrid capital at
scale.” This decision comparison with Rev 1 shows minor changes in wording, but
the expressly stated call to unlock additional financial resources is relevant.
“(d) Call on the boards of multilateral
development banks to schedule general capital increases [“to be completed by the end of 2026”] and consider further general capital increases in the future [“as required, taking into account the outcome of the
Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development”],
while recognizing recent capital contributions.” Rev-2 “allergic reaction” to
adopt concrete timeframes reappears in this decision.
A new Rev-2 added decision is included: “(e) Call upon the international financial institutions,
in partnership with the Secretary-General, to present options and
recommendations on new methodologies to improve access to concessional finance
for developing countries.” It would be convenient to include here a
mention to establish consultations also with donors and recipients' countries,
to engage the principal actors in the process.
Action 51. We will Accelerate the reform of the international financial
architecture to ensure countries can borrow
sustainably to invest in their long-term development [previously, “to enable
countries to borrow with confidence, promote access to affordable credit,
prevent unsustainable borrowing, and facilitate timely, coordinated and fair
debt restructuring and debt relief.”]
This is
another action with relevant changes, including in the action wording, where
references to “affordable credit,” and “facilitate timely, coordinated and fair debt
restructuring and debt relief” are erased.
“Borrowing is vital for
countries to invest in their long-term development,” Member States said to
introduce this action, and “Countries
must be able to borrow with confidence, sustainably, and have access to
affordable credit, while ensuring full transparency.” As we see, the
references in the action wording have been moved to its presentation.
Member States declared themselves “alarmed by the emergence of high and unsustainable debt
burdens [previously, “a new debt crisis”]
in many developing countries, the constraint this imposes on development
progress, and the weakness of safeguards to prevent these situations [previously, “such crisis”].” The idea that we are facing a debt
crisis is abandoned in Rev-2.
States move back to the issue of international architecture reform and “underline
the importance of reforms to existing multilateral processes to facilitate collective action to prevent debt
crises, facilitate debt restructuring and debt relief, when appropriate, taking into
account evolving trends in the
global debt landscape [previously, “in sovereign
borrowing”]. According to Rev-2, there is “no debt crisis,” but we need
to act to prevent it from happening.
States decide to:
“(a) Strengthen the multilateral response to support countries with high
and unsustainable debt burdens, with the meaningful participation of the
countries concerned, ensuring an approach that is more effective,
comprehensive, coordinated, systematic, transparent and timely to enable those
countries to
escape debt overhang and prioritize government expenditure on the achievement
of the Sustainable Development Goals.”. In Rev-1 this action was related to “Pursue a stronger, pro-active multilateral response to
the ongoing debt crisis that enables countries to sustainably escape debt,” but, as we notice, the approach to the debt as
changed neglecting now the existence of a crisis, and so the text has changed.
“(b) Invite the IMF [previously, “request the Secretary-General, in
collaboration with the IMF”], in collaboration with the Secretary-General, the World Bank, the Group
of 20 and major bilateral creditors, to
initiate [an independent] a review of the sovereign debt architecture.”
In Rev-1, the review mentioned above, now to
be led by the IMF, would be built on “the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, with a view to
making concrete recommendations reform to the Fourth International Conference
on Financing for Development in 2025”. In Rev-2, instead, it would be built on “existing international processes, including proposals for
establishing effective, efficient, equitable and comprehensive
multilateral debt mechanisms, an assessment of the implementation of the principles of responsible lending and borrowing, and proposals to improve
transparency, and upgrade tools for debt sustainability analysis.” Expressly mentioned in Rev-1, a reference to take “mechanisms to strengthen information-sharing and
transparency among all creditors and borrowers” into consideration is erased from Rev-2.
“(c) Request the Secretary-General to engage
with credit rating agencies to explore options to improve developing
countries’ access to credit in a sustainable way [previously,
“agree actions that enable access to resources”] and enhance ratings’ contribution to the achievement of the Sustainable
Development Goals.” From “agree actions” to “explore options” there is a huge
difference, and also from “access to resources” to “access to credit,” even if they are sustainable. We find in Rev-2 a weaker and more
credit-oriented decision.
“(d) Improve and continue to implement the G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatments to
enable effective, predictable, coordinated, timely and orderly [previously, “faster and fairer”] restructuring processes and encourage steps to ensure comparability of
treatment of sovereign and private creditors, including through respective
national legislation. The new wording could imply a more concrete
orientation, but “timely” does not mean “faster,” and none of the elements in the
list refers now to the fairness of the debt restructuring process.
A new decision (e) is included to “Promote, where appropriate, the use of state-contingent
clauses in all lending, including climate-resilient debt clauses when lending
to countries vulnerable to the adverse impact of climate change.” The
big question here is who will decide when the use of these clauses will be
appropriate. Moreover, what will happen if the reason for high vulnerability is
different than exposure to climate change? According to the decision, promoting
the use of state-contingent clauses would not be applicable.
Action 52. Accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture so that it shields
countries equitably during systemic shocks and makes the financial system
more stable.
This action introduction
acknowledges that “The growing frequency and
intensity of global economic shocks has set back progress on achieving
the Sustainable Development Goals.” This statement is followed by the Member
States recognition of a twofold “[“potential”] role of
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)”: on the one hand, “strengthening the global
financial safety net in a world prone to systemic shocks” and, in the other
hand. “to greater global financial stability.”
Consequently, States “welcome
[previously, “agree”] that
over $100 billion worth of SDRs are being innovatively and successfully
channeled to developing countries” and decide to:
“(a) Call on [previously, “encourage”] countries to continue to explore options to voluntarily
rechannel at least fifty percent of SDRs from the 2021 issuance, including
through multilateral development banks.” One more
time, the use of “explore” makes the action weaker.
“(b) Call upon the
IMF to explore all options to
continue to strengthen the global financial safety net to support
developing countries to better respond to macroeconomic shocks, including by
exploring ways to make rapid issuances of Special Drawing Rights and enable
prompt, voluntary rechanneling to developing countries during future financial
crises and systemic shocks.”. This text merges Rev-1 decisions (b) and (c) that
were shorter but stronger: “(b) Encourage the
IMF to develop protocols to facilitate rapid SDR issuances and voluntary
re-channeling during times of crisis.” “(c) Call upon the IMF to explore all
options to strengthen the global financial safety net to support developing
countries in response to macroeconomic shocks.”
Decision (c) is new: “Encourage
the IMF to revise its surcharge policy.”
Finally, decision (d) calls to “Promote financial stability through international cooperation on, and consistent regulation [previously, “establish consistent regulation”]
of banks and other financial service entities [in the financial
sector]. The wording incorporates new content
on promoting stability and consistent regulation of financial
services entities, including banks.
Action 53. Accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture so that it can
meet the challenge of climate change.
Again, this action and their attached decisions are different than in Rev-1.
“Climate change exacerbates
many of the challenges facing the international financial architecture and can undermine progress toward
the Sustainable Development Goals,” Member States said, and “countries
should not have to decide between pursuing development and addressing climate
change, and finance for climate change should not come at the expense of
assistance for other critical development needs, including poverty eradication, and promoting
sustainable, inclusive, resilient economic growth.”
A new phrase in Re- adds that “the international financial architecture must drive financing towards
both climate action and sustainable development. Investment in sustainable
development and climate action are both essential, interlinked and mutually
reinforcing,” before affirming a well-known truth; “Countries face
increasing financing needs, especially those vulnerable to climate-related
shocks, leading to a growing demand for concessional finance.”
Hence, Member States decide to include two new decisions:
“a) Call on Multilateral Development Banks to increase
the quality, quantity, accessibility and impact of climate and environmental
finance, particularly to developing countries most vulnerable to adverse
climate impacts, while safeguarding the additionality of climate finance,
including adaptation finance and support to deploy and develop renewable and
energy-efficiency technologies in line with existing commitments.” The
most essential part of this paragraph is that related to climate finance
additionality (to development financing flows), the specific mentions of
adaptation finance and energy-efficient technologies, even though the latest is
tied to “existing commitments” without reference to possible future commitments
(the use of the word “existing” here could be problematic in the future)
“(b) Call on
international financial institutions and other relevant entities to improve the
assessment and management of climate-related financial risks and support steps
to address the high cost of capital, working closely with developing countries.”
Rev-2 decision
(c) is based on Rev-1 decision (b). and reads as follows: “Ensure [previously, “take concrete steps to ensure”] that the private sector, especially large
corporations, contributes to sustainability and protecting our planet,
including through strengthening reporting procedures, establishing
accountability mechanisms for environmental damage caused by their activities and making ratings of investment products
more credible.” This paragraph reform moves in an opposite sense that most of
those we have reviewed, replacing “take concrete steps” by “ensure.”
One of the more clearly actionable decisions
of the entire PfF was under this action in Rev-1. It requested the Secretary-General, in partnership with
relevant stakeholders, “to
initiate an independent process to develop a set of metrics to inform future
access to and concessionality in climate and development financing, based on a
review of existing frameworks and taking into account all forms of
vulnerability and the multidimensional vulnerability index, and to put forward
options for consideration at the Fourth International Conference on Financing
for Development in 2025.” Sadly, it is erased
from Rev-2.
Action 54. Develop a framework on measures of progress on sustainable
development to complement and go beyond gross domestic product.
The UN Member States recognize that “sustainable development must be pursued in a balanced
and integrated manner” and “reaffirm the need to urgently
develop measures of progress on sustainable development that complement or go
beyond GDP,” measures that “should reflect progress on the economic, social and environmental dimensions of
sustainable development.”
In Rev-1, the only decision attached to this action was a request to the
SG, but in Rev-2, a new decision is added, so Member States decide to:
(a) Request the Secretary-General
to establish [previously, “establish”] an independent high-level expert group to
develop recommendations for a limited number of country-owned and universally
applicable indicators of
sustainable development that complement and go beyond GDP.”
This work should be done “in close consultation with Member States and
relevant stakeholders” and “taking into account the work of the Statistical
Commission, building on the
Global Indicators Framework for SDGs and targets of the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development.” The results should be presented “during the
eightieth session of the General Assembly” (which means between the second part
of 2025 and the first of 2026). A final call to “establish an intergovernmental process to consider
these recommendations” is now
extended and converted in Rev-2 decision (b) to “initiate a United
Nations-led intergovernmental process in consultation with relevant
stakeholders, including the UN Statistical Commission, international financial
institutions, multilateral development banks and regional commissions, in line
with their respective mandates, on measures of progress on sustainable
development that complement or go beyond gross domestic product, considering
the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s high-level expert group.”
Action 55. Strengthen the international response to complex global
shocks.
To open this action presentation, Member States “recognize the need for a more coherent, cooperative, coordinated and multidimensional
international response to complex global shocks and the central role of the United Nations in this
regard.” They explain that “complex global shocks are events that have
severely disruptive and adverse consequences for a significant proportion of countries and the global
population, and that lead to impacts across multiple sectors, requiring a
multidimensional, multistakeholder, and whole-of-society response.”
Complex global shocks, as states Rev-2 copying Rev-1, “have a
disproportionate impact on the poorest and most vulnerable people in the world
and usually have disastrous consequences for sustainable development and
prosperity.”
Accordingly, States affirm that “the principles of national ownership and consent,
equity, solidarity and partnership” will guide their responses to complex
global shocks “with full respect for international law and the Charter, including its purposes
and principles, and existing
mandates for United Nations intergovernmental bodies and processes, United
Nations’ system entities, and specialized agencies.” Let us
underline here that the UN Charter is part of international law, and its purposes and principles are in articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, so is it
essential to mention that states will respect the three while responding
to complex global shocks? Even if they do not mention them that was never a
legal option.
States voice then that they “will [previously, “commit to”]
uphold the Secretary-General’s role to, inter alia, convene Member States,
coordinate the whole multilateral system, and engage with relevant stakeholders
in response to crises.”
Four decisions under this action in Rev-1, all of them requests to the Secretary-General,
are converted into two:
Rev-2 decision (a) combines
Rev-1 decisions (a), (b), and (c): “Develop, in consultation with Member States, protocols for convening
and operationalizing emergency platforms (previously, “Convene and operationalize emergency platforms”] based on flexible approaches to respond to a
range of different complex global shocks, including criteria for triggering and phasing out
emergency platforms, ensuring that emergency platforms are convened for
a finite period and will not be a standing institution or entity.”
Decision (b) is aimed to “ensure
that the convening of emergency platforms supports and complements the response
of United Nations’ principal organs, relevant United Nations
entities and specialized agencies mandated to respond to crises, and that it will
not affect or interfere with the mandated role of any United Nations’ system
entities, specialized agencies, intergovernmental body or duplicate ongoing
intergovernmental processes, including the mandated role of the Security
Council in the maintenance of international peace and security.” Changes here seem to
be oriented to better align the UN responses to global complex crises with
eventual ad-hoc emergency platforms. States have been particularly attentive
to include an express mention of the Security Council, the only UN organ named explicitly in the decision.
Action 56. Strengthen the implementation of and compliance with multilateral
environmental agreements to deliver on our ambition to protect our
planet.
Rev-1 framed this action as “strengthen
the international governance arrangements for the environment to enhance
cooperation and deliver on our ambition to protect our planet” (§50).
In this action, Member States “recognize the critical importance of tackling global environmental
challenges [“and crises”]
to the future well-being of people and planet, and the need to implement existing multilateral
environmental agreements.” The addition is confusing: To strengthen
multilateralism, do states recognize that they shall implement treaties they have signed
and ratified? Or is this decision aimed at non-members/parts of MEAs asking
them to apply such agreements? Whatever the case could be, it is an
international law nonsense and a reflex of governments' impossibility to find a
way to deal with environmental issues clearly and strongly, just as “we, the
peoples of the United Nations,” are asking.
The only decision attached to this action is to “(a) explore options in the United Nations
Environment Assembly to accelerate the implementation
of and strengthen
compliance with all multilateral environmental agreements [previously, “to strengthen the global governance of the environment
with the aim of accelerating the implementation of existing commitments and
strengthening compliance and accountability, including commitments related to
financing action”] to address global environmental challenges [and crises].”
This is a new “denied crisis” in this
Chapter, together with the “debt crisis”: in both cases, Rev-2 avoids using the
word “crisis” that was part of Rev-1. Nevertheless, the reform is
far worse in this case since the specific references to strengthening accountability on
environmental commitments, including those related to environmental financing,
were erased from the PfF.
Action 57. Strengthen our [engagement and] partnerships [with relevant stakeholders] to deliver on existing
commitments and address new and emerging challenges.
Member States “recognize the importance of strengthening the United Nations’ engagement
with national parliaments
and relevant stakeholders [previously, “other
actors”] while preserving the intergovernmental character of the
Organization.” The last addition could be problematic, because someone
will have to establish the limits, and there are not even close to having a
consensus around that issue. It is a way to “postpone the problem and let
others will need to deal with it.”
Decisions under this action are to:
“(a) Ensure that relevant stakeholders can
meaningfully participate in relevant United Nations’ processes and that Member
States have access to the views and expertise of partners on a systematic
basis.” Again, the previously mentioned problem of defining which groups and
persons are relevant on a case-by-case basis, without agreed indications.
“(b) Leverage existing and establish
new channels of [previously, “establish”] continuous and open communication between United Nations
intergovernmental bodies and civil society, allowing for ongoing dialogue,
exchange of information and collaboration beyond formal meetings [“including through briefings, consultations, and
interactive dialogues”]. Nothing relevant here.
“(c) Encourage [previously, “leverage”] the private sector’s [“unique role and”] contribution to addressing global challenges and
strengthen their accountability towards the implementation of the agreed
frameworks of the United Nations.”
“(d) Deepen United Nations’ engagement with national parliaments in
United Nations intergovernmental bodies and processes.” Without changes, this
paragraph was numbered (e) in Rev-1 and was moved one step higher in Rev-2.
“(e) Strengthen the engagement of local and regional authorities in
United Nations intergovernmental bodies and processes and request the
Secretary-General to provide recommendations on this matter by the end of the
seventy-ninth session
for Member States’
consideration, including on
how engagement with local and regional authorities can contribute to the
localization of the Sustainable Development Goals.” This last addition could
be the entry point for officially recognizing the Local Voluntary Reports. I’m totally in favor, but it will not change the multilateralism. In other words, a well-intentioned but out-of-place addition.
“(f) Enhance cooperation between the United Nations and regional,
sub-regional and other organizations, which will be critical to maintaining international peace and
security, promoting and protecting human rights, and achieving sustainable
development.” No reforms were introduced to this decision in Rev-2.
Action 58. We will strengthen the
governance of outer space to foster its peaceful, safe, [“secure”] and
sustainable uses for the benefit of all humanity [“including developing
countries”].
Deleting “secure”
use of outer space is terrible news, mainly because it could be easily linked
to the increasing military interest. The deletion of the final part,
however, is really appreciated: It is very close to discrimination to explain that
humanity includes those persons living in developing countries.
Despite having erased the reference to the secure use
of outer space, states present this action affirming that “the exploration and use of
Outer Space for peaceful purposes is identified by international law as a province of all humankind [previously, “global common, guided by the principle of the common heritage of mankind”]. Rev-2 wording repeats here the word of the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (commonly known as “Outer Space
Treaty”) signed in January 1967. The Rev-1 wording was closer to a more modern
approach. This is a fantastic example of how new words are needed, governments'
attachment to old-agreed formulas, and a reminder of how difficult it will be to
change multilateralism using old words.
States continue: “Humanity’s reliance on space [previously, “relationship to outer space”] is increasing day-by-day [previously,
“dramatically
changing”], and we need global governance to be implemented [previously,
“adapt”].” These changes are a matter of focus:
if our relationship with outer space is changing daily (maybe “quickly” would
fit best), that means it is dramatically changing, but day-by-day sounds less
urgent. Do we need a new governance or to adapt the current one? There is no concrete
answer to that question because what we need is efficient and up-to-date
governance. The two paths allow that to happen, while none ensures it happens.
We live through an age of
increased access and activities [previously,
“operations”] in outer space. The growth in the number of objects in outer space, the
increasing role of the private sector, the return of humans to deep space, and
our expanding reliance on outer space systems demands urgent action [previously, “demands that we urgently establish inclusive and equitable
global governance that is fit for purpose today and in the future”]. With this change, the reference to inclusivity and
equity as guides for a future outer space governance has faded away.
Finally, Member
States voice that “Safe and sustainable use of space [previously,
“stronger outer space governance”] is
critical to the achievement of Agenda 2030. The opportunities for people and
planet are enormous, but there are also risks that must be managed.” The focus
has changed again from the governance of outer space to its use. The issue is that we need that governance to ensure safety and sustainability in outer
space. The unchanged final part recognizes, in a very general way, that outer
space provides opportunities and risks that should be managed. That is why the
focus should be on developing strong outer space governance.
After that introduction to the action, States
decide to:
“(a) Implement existing global
governance and establish new frameworks for space traffic, space debris, and
space resources through [previously, “launch a process in”] the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space [“to develop a
unified regime for space sustainability in the areas of space traffic
management, space debris removal, and space resource activities, including
coordination on missions and exchange of data and findings from the exploration
and use of the Moon and other celestial bodies”].
In the rewording, the Rev-1 references to space sustainability, coordination
and exchange of data and findings from celestial bodies are lost (and please, stop
using “celestial bodies and the Moon”: The Moon is a celestial body).
“(b) Invite
[previously, “strengthen”] the
engagement of relevant private sector, civil society, and other relevant
stakeholders, where appropriate, to inform [previously, “in”] intergovernmental processes related to the increased safety and
sustainability of outer
space. The engagement is suddenly oriented in only one direction “to inform,”
and only “where appropriate” to consider “safety and sustainability” of outer
space, that means excluding one of the three areas mentioned in the action
wording, not accidentally the peaceful use of outer space.
Conclusion
According to the Summit of the Future UN website, the main goal
of the meeting is “to forge a new international consensus on how we deliver a
better present and safeguard the future.”
Looking through that lens, Chapter Five seems to me
the most critical part of the Pact for the Future. At the same time, it is the
weaker.
The actions and decisions
in this Chapter are not improved because of the reforms introduced to Rev-1. Using
action-oriented verbs in wording decisions is helpful, but making decisions
actionable requires including at least minimal details on future steps that allow the implementation processes to move forward. Those details are not here, and that
is highly problematic, particularly when we pair it with Rev-2 notable
regression in financing for development, an area in which almost every
timeframe in Rev-1 has been erased because of “mandate limits.”
Despite the urgent need to
reform multilateralism recognized by the UN Member States in this Chapter, Rev-2
opts for deleting Rev-1 references to existing debt and environmental crisis,
now transmuted into “challenges.”
The absence of a first
formal paragraph proposal on reforming the Security Council exposes the
tensions around this issue. However, not only the real opportunities for a strengthened
multilateralism but also the entire Chapter 3 on peace and security chance to succeed
are tied to that “phantom paragraph.”
Sadly, some of the most
interesting proposals from civil society, academia, experts, and
practitioners, such as creating a UN Parliament or transforming the
Trusteeship Council into a sustainable development implementation body, have
not been received in the Pact.
